Introduction
For the sake of financial stability, nearly every aspect of banking is shaped by regulation.
Government policy affects banks' competitive position, profitability, and risk taking behavior by imposing entry and exit barriers, by setting deposit rate ceilings, by directly restricting bank activities to a safety set, by guaranteeing deposits, and by changing tax rules.
Banks' activities and risk taking behavior may also be restricted indirectly by capital, liquidity or leverage requirements, accompanied by appropriate monitoring and supervision provisions to ensure enforcement of regulations. This set of government-imposed constraints provides strong incentives for banks to develop a corporate political strategy that addresses some of the constraints. This is especially the case if institutions are weak enough for regulatory bodies to be subject to political capture (Hellman et al. 2003) . 1 Further, the empirical literature suggests that highly concentrated and regulated industries (e.g., Masters and Keim 1985; Schuler et al. 2002) characterized by a few large firms (Salamon and Seigfried 1977) are more likely to engage in lobbying and campaign activities. 2 This suggests that the banking industry, which is typically highly concentrated, regulated and dominated by big banking firms, is particularly suited to establishing political connections and other lobbying activities. One good example of political capture is provided by Laeven (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) , who find that generous deposit insurance schemes are adopted mainly by countries with poorly capitalized banks and result from extensive lobbying efforts.
Besides influencing policymaking by lobbying, banks may even appoint politically connected directors in order to extract more direct and bank-specific rents from the government, which would not otherwise be available to the bank. In particular, a strong political relationship can be considered an important intangible asset for dismantling bureaucratic obstacles, attracting public deposit accounts, and receiving preferential treatment in the form of bank-specific reduced supervisory oversight, regulatory forbearance or even bailouts. Depositors may even perceive the presence of politically connected banks' directors or chairmen as a signal of an implicit government guarantee. As a consequence of cheap government funding, more flexible supervisory and regulatory boundaries and the presence of an implicit government guarantee, politically connected banks may be expected to be subject to less market discipline from depositors. The aim of this paper is to test the conjecture that political connections reduce depositor discipline.
The idea behind market discipline is that investors in bank liabilities actively reward or punish banks in regard to their risk taking behavior. In the case of excessive risk taking, investors can demand higher returns on bank liabilities or withdraw their funds.
The disciplining of banks involves both price and quantity adjustments in bank liabilities.
By making risk taking more costly for banks, depositors reduce banks' incentive to take excessive risk, which should promote the stability of the financial system. This incentivecompatible regulatory design has been greatly stimulated by the Basle II reforms, aimed in part at remedying the moral hazard cost of the mispriced government guarantees inherent in the regulatory paradigm of , which featured safety nets and crisis prevention.
Market forces can also remedy other deficiencies of the supervisory framework, such as information asymmetries. Even though bank supervisors can conduct on-site examinations, markets may jointly know more than the inspections can reveal.
Much of the evidence of depositor discipline is from countries with mature and relatively transparent banking sectors 3 . Both price and quantity discipline have been shown to exist in the US banking sector, particularly with respect to deposits that are not fully insured. A recent study using cross-country panel data from thirty-two OECD countries confirms the presence of disciplining behavior in other mature institutional environments (Nier and Baumann, 2006) . Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) use data from a sample of both OECD and developing countries and find a negative relationship between the implicit cost of bank funds and prior period measures of bank capitalization, profitability and liquidity.
The evidence for quantity disciplining is less convincing in their study. Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) investigate Central and Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile and Mexico) and demonstrate that banks' deposits increase and their deposit rates generally decrease with a reduction in the percentage of non-performing loans and improvements in liquidity and capitalization. Karas et al. (2010) show that surprisingly sophisticated and capital-based depositor discipline is also present in a European emerging market -Russia.
By verifying whether depositors impose less discipline on politically connected banks, this paper connects two hitherto separate strands of the literature. The deposit insurance literature suggests that deposit insurance entails a tradeoff between greater protection against bank runs and an increasing propensity of banks to take on additional risk, because depositors no longer have incentives to monitor banks and, hence, do not claim an interest payment commensurate with the bank's risk choice. For instance, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find evidence that explicit deposit insurance schemes tend to increase the likelihood of banking crises in a sample of 61 countries over 1980-1997. Most empirical studies do confirm that explicit deposit insurance indeed undercuts market discipline. The cross-country study conducted by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) shows that the introduction of a blanket guarantee disturbs market incentives too deeply to discipline banks via deposit rates. Karas et al. (2013) conduct a natural experiment to show convincingly that this is also the case for Russia. On the other hand, Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) provide evidence that small insured depositors still react to bank risk after the introduction of deposit insurance. This indicates that depositors are not only concerned about individual bank insolvency, but also about the solvency of the insurance fund and willingness of the government to support the insurer (Flannery 1998) . These insights may also extend to the effect of political connections on market discipline. If political connections imply an implicit government guarantee, or increase the likelihood of bailout in any other way, they may disturb efficient price formation in deposit markets and hence reduce depositor discipline. This will, however, only occur if depositors believe political connection will help the connected bank to secure government support.
Our work is also related to an emerging body of research that focuses on the economic value of political connections. Fisman (2001) finds that stock prices of firms connected to the Suharto regime are negatively affected by rumors about Suharto's health. In a cross-country setting, Faccio (2006) (Stigler 1971; De Soto 1990) and bailout options ). In addition, Faccio (2006) finds a greater prevalence of favorable treatment in association with political connections in countries with weak property rights regimes. 5
Although, on balance, the literature favors the view that close ties with the government help in finding a helping hand, there are some studies that come to the opposite conclusion. In a cross-country setting, Boubakri et al. (2008) observe a negative relationship between political connectedness and accounting performance. Fan et al. (2007) find that newly privatized Chinese firms with politically connected CEOs are associated with poor post-IPO performance. Qian et al. (2011) find that minority shareholders are expropriated by controlling owners through their political connections. Bertrand et al. (2007) show that connected French firms pursue political goals by creating jobs at the expense of profitability. These results can be explained by the grabbing hand view (Shleifer and Vishny 1998), i.e., former politicians are more inclined to divert resources for political and personal objectives than to pursue maximum value of the firm. This paper differs from the above studies by examining the economic effect of a bank's rather than a firm's political connections. We focus on the mechanism of moral hazard. Depositors of politically connected banks may exert less discipline on their banks, which helps the connected bank to expropriate rents in the form of an expanding deposit base and lower funding costs, as compared to its peers.
We employ a unique dataset of 79 Turkish banks for the period 1980 to 2008 that comprises data on balance sheets, income and expense statements, ownership and political connections. Political connections for firms in most of the developing countries like Turkey are mainly established by putting politicians on their payroll. This gives us a direct measure of the political connectedness of the board of directors and is readily observable to depositors, so that it can affect market discipline. More indirect ways of exerting political power, like electoral campaign contributions, are not likely to be observable by depositors in most countries and so cannot be expected to impact depositor discipline.
We find that Turkish depositors discipline their banks through the capital ratio.
Banks with lower capital exhibit slower deposit growth and pay their depositors higher deposit rates. The introduction of full-blanket deposit insurance fails to reduce depositor discipline significantly, suggesting that depositors had less than complete trust in the government's pledge to guarantee their deposits. Political connections affect market discipline.
Specifically, depositors exert less discipline on their banks when banks' top executives were formerly elected to parliament, unless these served as a cabinet minister. These effects are stronger if the former politician's party is currently in power, lending support to the thesis that the impact is really driven by political connections to a ruling party. Hiring a former cabinet member is less effective in reducing market discipline because depositors may perceive it as a signal of implicit structural problems that the bank can only solve with the aid of a former-minister's political clout. In addition, the new government deposits brought by the minister are also fickle and tend to leave the bank with the minister.
This article is organized as follows. The next section describes the sample of banks, discusses the methodology of the depositor discipline model, and presents the baseline results. In Section 3, we test whether the blanket guarantee scheme affected depositor discipline. In Section 4, we allow for interaction between bank fundamentals and political connection. Section 5 presents robustness checks and offers some explanations for the results. In Section 6, we examine whether there is a disparity in depositor discipline as between different types of agents. The last section contains concluding remarks.
Data and baseline model of depositor discipline
We use an unbalanced panel of 79 Turkish banks from various issues of Banks in Turkey, published by the Banks Association of Turkey. This publication includes balance sheets and income statements for these banks for 1980-2008. We chose the year 1980 as a starting point because in July of that year the government embarked on a program of financial liberalization and removed deposit rate ceilings on loans and deposits in order to increase competition in the banking sector. In Appendix 1, we present an overview and short history of the Turkish banking industry. We use only public information that is available to depositors. 6 Of the 79 banks, 33 banks were classified as foreign banks, 50 banks were domestically owned commercial banks and 13 were classified as state-owned deposit taking banks. 7 This study concentrates on commercial banks, as they function as universal banks (offering a broad range of products and services such as deposit-taking, commercial lending, trading financial instruments, insurance, leasing and investment banking), and hence operate relatively homogeneously. We exclude investment banks and State Deposit Insurance Fund banks (SDIF banks) from the sample. Our methodological approach is (i) to in-fer whether market discipline is present using evidence from both deposit rate and deposit growth regressions, (ii) to address the question whether a full blanket guarantee affects market discipline, and (iii) to assess whether political connectedness hampers depositors'
incentives to monitor and discipline their banks. Methodological details are provided in the concerned sections.
A baseline model of depositor discipline
We first examine all the bank fundamentals, in order to discover which variables depositors focus on when disciplining their banks. The most convincing evidence of depositor discipline would emerge if depositors withdraw their funds whenever the asset quality of their bank is no longer satisfactory. Consequently, because of this upward shift of the deposit supply curve, the bank will face deposit outflows and climbing deposit rates. This is why analyzing both the reactions of deposit prices and quantities is important, as only such combined information will enable us to disentangle depositor discipline from demand shifts and regulatory shocks (Park 1995 , Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001 , Ioannidou and de Dreu 2006 , Karas et al. 2010 . A positive relation between bank risk and deposit rates could for example also reflect a demand effect rather than discipline, with risky banks pursuing a more aggressive expansion strategy to meet new loan demand. But this would be revealed by looking at the quantity regression, where the relation between bank risk and deposit quantity would also be positive for a demand effect but negative for true depositor discipline.
Using reduced form equations, the following baseline models are estimated, in which we measure the reaction of deposits (Eq. 1) and deposit rates (Eq. 2) to bank risk taking, respectively:
The dependent variables are the traditional measures of market discipline. , is the first difference of the log of deposits for bank i in period t and , is the implicit interest rate on deposits of bank i at time t. To avoid non-stationarity, we use the growth rate (rather than level) of total deposits. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the numerical measures of the dependent variables, bank fundamentals and bank controls for the sample period 1980-2008. We notice that the average yearly percentage change in deposits has been positive across banks and over time (16.20%), but with a high degree of dispersion (58.48%) and a substantial difference between minimum and maximum values. On the other hand, the implicit interest rate reveals that the banking sector has historically paid high deposit rates.
In line with the literature, represents a vector of accounting measures of bank-specific risk characteristics (e.g., Park and Peristiani 1998, Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001) . 8 This vector comprises one-year lags because of the delay in publication of balance sheet and income statement information. Furthermore, this lag structure helps to mollify our concerns about endogeneity. The capital ratio ( ) is the ratio of book value of equity to total assets. This ratio tells us how secure is the cushion against declining bank asset values, and informs outsiders of the solvency of the bank. We expect that this variable will be positively related to deposits and negatively related to deposit rates, ceteris paribus. The summary statistics in Table 1 reveal that the average capital ratio in our sample is 12%. The variable is the ratio of liquid assets (such as cash, central bank debt and short-term government securities) to total deposits. As this ratio measures the bank's ability to cover deposit withdrawals, we expect to see a positive relationship with deposits and a negative one with deposit rates. The variable, which proxies for a riskier asset management strategy, is the ratio of loans under follow-up to gross loans. Because a high non-performing loans ratio is associated with higher credit risk, all else equal, we expect this ratio will have a negative impact on deposit growth and positive impact on the interest ratio. , profit after taxes divided by total assets, proxies for management's ability to generate profits from the bank´s assets. We expect, ceteris paribus, this ratio will have a positive impact on deposit growth and a negative impact on the deposit rate. To moderate the inordinate influence of extreme values, we winsorize the dependent and bank risk variables at the 2% level in both tails. Strong evidence of market discipline emerges when the signs of the estimated coefficients of bank fundamentals differ in the two equations, for example for capitalization α 1 > 0 and β 1 < 0. The disturbance terms ε i,t and µ i,t are independently distributed with mean zero and variance σ i,t 2 . Following most prior research, we estimate a model using bank fixed fects, α i for the deposit reaction and β i for deposit rate reaction, to control for the unob- is the annual change in the Turkish Lira/US Dollar parity. As in Barajas and Steiner (2000) and Mondschean and Opiela (1999) , we address the issue of bank ownership in market discipline. We differentiate between public, private and foreign banks: public banks (Statebanks) are predominantly owned by the government, private banks are domestically owned commercial banks with more than 50% of shares owned by Turkish residents, and foreign banks (Foreign-banks) are either branches of foreign banks or Turkish banks with at least 50% of their shares owned by non-residents. Private domestic banks serve as the reference group.
Estimation results
Estimation results of Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 are summarized in Table 2. Panel A and Panel B show the results for the quantity and price equations, respectively. In the first four columns of each panel, the four sets of bank risk variables are estimated separately; while the last column of each panel presents their joint estimations. If we assume a positively sloped deposit supply curve and a negatively sloped deposit demand curve, based on the effects of bank fundamentals on deposit growth and deposit rate, we can infer whether there is a strong presence of market discipline (Park 1995) . In particular, we are interested in the identification of variables that cause deposit supply shifts. An increase in the capital ratio ( ) leads to an increase in deposit growth and a decrease in deposit rates, i.e., the major effect is a rightward shift of the deposit supply curve (α 1 > 0 β 1 < 0). In contrast, a higher liquidity position of the bank ( ) results in a higher deposit growth, but also in a higher deposit rate, suggesting that liquidity is predominantly a demand shifter, rather than a supply shifter. Note that the two remaining risk variables ( and ) also fail to produce net shifts of the deposit supply curve.
It turns out that only the capital ratio gives convincing evidence of the presence of depositor discipline, since it conclusively leads to a shift of the deposit supply curve (i.e., statistically significant with the expected and opposite signs in the two equations). Specifically, depositors are willing to supply more funds at lower deposit rates to bettercapitalized banks. This suggests that depositors put most weight on the capital ratio in evaluating banks' riskiness. This is not surprising since the capital ratio is a simple but a very powerful indicator of bank risk: a high capital ratio serves as a secure cushion against declining bank asset values. It is also a signal to outsiders about the solvency position of the bank as it faces credit, liquidity, operational, off balance sheet, legal and macroeconomic risks. Consequently, more than any other measure, the capital ratio is extensively used as a proxy for bank risk taking in market discipline studies, in both developed and emerging market economies (e.g., Cook and Spellman 1994 , Hannan and Hanweck 1988 , Park and Peristiani 1998 , Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001 , Karas et al. 2010 ).
Most bank-specific control variables enter both the deposit growth equation and the deposit rate equation significantly. The variable shows us that the larger banks have a competitive advantage, as they attract on average more deposits while not having to pay higher deposit rates. This probably means that depositors perceive larger banks as "too big to fail", as they perform a key role in the functioning of financial markets and the pay- Table 2 Testing for the presence of depositor discipline
Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2012), the larger Turkish banks manage their portfolio risk more efficiently and achieve a more optimal risk/return profile. We notice that Turkish depositors are eager to deposit their funds and accept lower deposit rates in exchange for a better quality of client oriented bank service ( ). In order to gain market share in the deposit market, newer banks offer higher deposit rates than older banks ( ) in order to attract more deposits. Political fragmentation ( ) is related to higher deposit growth and higher deposit rates, suggesting that depositors are willing to save more in times of political uncertainty, but not without requiring a risk premium to compensate for the higher general uncertainty. All else equal, crisis years do not significantly impact the deposit or price equation. We observe that deposits increase during the military intervention period ( ), probably because depositors consider deposit accounts a safe haven in troubled times. In good economic times ( ), banks pay lower rates on deposits, but do not experience higher deposit growth.
Neither the growth in deposits nor the pricing of deposits seem to be much affected by , and depositors are not compensated for currency depreciation by higher deposit rates. State-owned banks pay higher deposit rates, but have still seen their share in the deposit market reduced. Although foreign-owned banks also pay higher rates on deposits, this does not significantly boost their deposit growth.
Depositor discipline and blanket deposit insurance
In the following two specifications, bank fundamentals interact with a full deposit insurance dummy variable, which enables us to examine the impact of a full blanket guarantee on depositor discipline:
where DI is a dummy variable that takes the value one for the full blanket guarantee period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) and zero otherwise. The Turkish government instituted full deposit coverage in response to the collapse of three small banks on May 5, 1994, to restore confidence in the banking system. This blanket guarantee was in place for a long period and was actually reinforced during the second major banking crisis in 2000. With the stabilization of the banking sector in the aftermath of the 2000 crisis, the insurance coverage was eventually limited to 50 thousand TL on July 5, 2004, a limit that currently remains in place (see, e.g.,
Tanyeri 2010 and Laeven and Valencia 2012 for a detailed discussion).
The coefficients α 2 and β 2 identify the change in depositor discipline induced by the deposit insurance. In line with theory and previous empirical findings, if the blanket guarantee indeed reduced depositor sensitivity to bank capitalization, we expect that α 2 < 0 and β 2 > 0. So far, we have reached the conclusion that market discipline takes place through the capital ratio, as higher levels of capital buffers lead to both faster deposit growth and lower deposit rates. Given the continuous importance of the capital ratio as the only clear driver of depositor discipline, we focus our attention in the remainder of this paper on the capital ratio. Table 3 presents the results of the impact of an explicit full blanket guarantee on depositor discipline via the deposits equation and price equation (respectively, column 1 and 2 of Table 3 ). Recall that the coefficient of interaction terms * in equations (3) and (4) measures the changes in intensity of market discipline during the full blanket period. 9 The results tell us that the introduction of a full blanket guarantee did not have much of an impact on the intensity of depositor discipline. This finding indicates that the adoption of such a scheme was not credible, or that depositors still feared costs related to the recovery of deposits in case of failure (i.e., costs due to late payments and the foregone interest earnings). 10 9 Although we estimate the most flexible specification with Equity, Liquidity, Bad loans, ROA, and a full set of interactions, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we report only Equity and its interaction with DI in the discussion of results as only Equity proved to unambiguously lead to depositor discipline. Full results are available upon request. 10 In developing countries, it is frequently observed that deposit insurance schemes are not fully credible.
Besides the work of Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) referred to in the introduction of this article, Prean and Stix (2011) show that Croatian depositors perceive the safety of their deposits to be relatively low during turbulent times. More importantly, the finding that a generous deposit insurance scheme is not an effective tool for improving market confidence is also confirmed for Turkey (Önder and Özyildirim 2008) . Table 3 Impact of blanket deposit guarantee and political connections on depositor discipline
Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Political connections and depositor discipline
Since the major goal of this paper is to estimate changes in intensity of market discipline after a former politician takes the helm of the bank, we estimate the following reduced form quantity and price equations:
where is a vector of two sets of bank-specific political connections, i.e., PCON and MIN.
Regression estimations of equations (5) and (6), are reported in Table 3 , columns 3 and 4, respectively. Given these estimations, we first determine whether depositors perceive a top bank executive with past political experience as an implicit government guarantee. The coefficients of α 3 and β 3 measure the change in intensity of depositor discipline for the period that the politically connected person is at the head of the bank ( ). In particular, if there is a reduction in depositor sensitivity to bank capitalization, we would find that α 3 < 0 and β 3 > 0. We proceed, in columns 5 and 6, to determine whether depositors react differently to appointments of former prime ministers or cabinet members ( ) versus ordinary parliamentarians.
We use data from a variety of sources published by The Grand National Assembly We focus on the most objective and direct form of political connections, although there are other indirect, more opaque forms, of political connections (ranging from politicians' relatives on the board to less subtle forms such as bribery or corruption).
To summarize the above description: is a dummy variable which takes the value one when a bank CEO or Chairman was previously a member of the Turkish Parliament and/or served as a cabinet member or prime minister, and zero otherwise; is a dummy variable which takes the value one when a bank's CEO or Chairman was formerly a cabinet member or prime minister, and zero otherwise. According to the definitions above, we identify 27 politically connected directors among 21 banks (20 private commercial banks and 1 state bank). The number of bank-year observations for former parliament members is 106, and for former cabinet members 78. The average number of years that a former politician heads a bank is four. yields a non-positive number and reveals that depositors do not at all impose discipline on 11 It is reasonable to hypothize that political connections of other board members will not have any effect on market discipline, as these individuals are much less known to depositors. 12 Although we estimate the most flexible specification with Equity, Liquidity, Bad loans, ROA, and a full set of interactions, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we report only Equity and its interactions with POL in the discussion of our results, as only Equity proved to unambiguously lead to depositor discipline.
a bank while a former politician is at the helm. Column 4 indicates that the interaction term * enters the deposit rate equation with a significant positive relationship, causing the coefficient to become approximately zero (summing coefficients: -0.4204+0.4401). These results indicate that risky, less capitalized banks attract more deposits and pay lower interest when they appoint a former politician as a Chairman or CEO.
We interpret these findings as rightward shifts in the supply of deposits to risky but politically connected banks. These findings suggest that depositors believe that politically connected banks are safer, irrespective of bank fundamentals.
Compared to a full-blanket deposit insurance scheme, one may wonder why depositors have more trust in political connected banks than generally in insured banks. The main problem with deposit insurance schemes is that they may be less than fully credible.
While the initiation of a blanket guarantee may succeed in restoring some basic confidence when a country is on the verge of financial collapse, it still may not fully undo depositors'
fear of a systemic meltdown. Especially when the coverage is unlimited, as it was in Turkey, the capacity of governments to make good on their promised guarantees may be rightly questioned by depositors. Indeed, in this case the contingent liabilities of deposit insurance are massive, and depositors may thus have good reasons to suspect that there will be considerable costs associated with the recovery of the deposits if a systemic meltdown does occur (for instance in the form of late payments, foregone interest earnings and/or less than full redemption of deposits). Schich (2008) provides an excellent discussion of the possible problems associated with extended deposit insurance schemes. In addition, deposit insurance is provided to all banks, whereas political connections clearly are not. Depositors may therefore anticipate that banks appoint former politicians to gain access to political resources and the associated competitive advantages (as discussed in the introduction, e.g., implicit government guarantees, access to government deposits as complementary funding, regulatory forbearance, and bailouts). Since political connections, in contrast to deposit insurance, are available only to certain banks, the benefits of these connections may be more affordable to the government and hence more credible to depositors, than deposit insurance.
In order to examine possible differential effects between former cabinet members and ordinary parliament members, we include triple interaction terms. This strategy enables us to identify the separate impact of former cabinet members on depositor discipline.
Intriguingly, Column 5 shows that the triple interaction term * * enters the deposit equation with a statistically and economically significant positive coeffi-cient. Relative to the presence of ordinary parliamentarians, the presence of a former minister increases the sensitivity of deposit growth to bank capital (1.8837 -4.4556 < 1.8837 -4.4556 + 2.8487). Column 6 shows that this triple interaction term also enters the deposit rate equation, now with a statistically significant negative impact. Relative to the presence of ordinary parliamentarians, the presence of a former minister increases the sensitivity of deposit rates to bank capital (-0.4513 + 0.9864 > -0.4513 + 0.9864 -0.6553). These results suggest that political connections induce a far greater reduction in market discipline if the political connection is through a former member of parliament rather than through a former minister. Depositors seem to reduce their discipline more if the politically connected person did not serve as a minister. We see two possible explanations for this unexpected finding with respect to former ministers. First, depositors may fear that in banks with former ministers at the helm, using the terminology of Shleifer and Vishny (1998) , the grabbing hand will impair the helping hand. More specifically, depositors may believe that former ministers will extract political benefits at the expense of other bank stakeholders. 13 This phenomenon may also be intensified by the instability of the governments in which these people have served. 14 In Appendix 2, we briefly review the historical developments in the Turkish political landscape. An alternative interpretation is that the appointment of a former cabinet member may convey a negative message concerning the bank's financial health. Hiring a former cabinet member may be perceived as a signal of otherwise unobserved structural problems the bank can only solve with the help of a politically well-connected former minister. In Section 5 we provide evidence that unhealthy banks are indeed more likely to hire former ministers, which is in line with this argument. Later in this section we also show how the additional government deposits brought to the bank by the former minister tend to leave the bank upon his/her departure (see Figure 1 ). 13 The importance of bureaucratic background seems to be a structural characteristic of the ministerial elite: the occupational histories of 80% of the minister-year observations appear to include some public employment prior to entering politics, whereas the comparable figure is below 10% for normal deputies. Moreover, when banks do appoint former ministers they appear to be highly experienced, with long years of service compared to normal deputies. Hence, former ministers have stronger personal networks and knowledge of administrative procedures to effectively use their clout in government apparatus. This intuition is also in line with Kalaycioglu (1995) who argues that in Turkey newcomer MPs have difficulties in establishing relationships with the public bureaucracy. 14 A majority of the ex-ministers served in the seventies, a decade of political turbulence and short-lived governments with frequent military intervention in politics. Turkey witnessed during that decade many coalition governments leading to a seriously undermined public confidence in the central authority. The public may hold cabinet members responsible for cabinet instability, so that their presence may not be a good signal to depositors. Depositors may have loathed banks that took these former politicians on board so that the ensuing increased depositor discipline could be seen in part as a way of settling the score for the previous curtailment of democratic rights.
Figure 1
Average growth rate of the number of government and private deposit accounts around periods in which a former cabinet member leaves office.
The graph of the average growth rate of the number of deposit accounts (#DEPG) around the period in which a former cabinet members leaves office, over a seven-year window [-4, 0, +3] . We distinguish between growth rates of government deposit accounts (#GOVDEPG, dashed line) and other (private) deposit accounts (#PRIVDEPG, solid line). The years [-4, -1] represent the last three years in which the former cabinet member is at the top of the bank; the year 0 is the event-year in which the former cabinet member leaves the bank; and the years [+1, +3] represent the three years after departure.
Via Eq. 7 and Eq. 8 we examine whether our findings are stronger if the party of affiliation of the former politician is part of the ruling majority during his/her time as head of the bank. The variable GOV is set to one when the party of the politician heading the bank is currently in the (coalition) government, and zero otherwise. 15 The introduction of the triple interaction term * * enables us to examine whether the sensitivity of depositor discipline intensifies when the (last) party of the former politician is currently in power (i.e., GOV). The introduction of the quadruple interaction terms * * * again allows us to differentiate between former cabinet members and parliamentarians. 16 On the one hand, we observe that depositor discipline is completely wiped out for risky, less capitalized banks in periods when the (last) party of 15 When the affiliated party ceased to exist, we checked whether its successor is in the coalition government during the period that the former politician is at the top of the bank. 16 We estimate the following reduced form equations: i,t = α i + α 1 i,t−1 + α 2 i,t−1 * DI t + α 3 i,t−1 * PCON i,t−1 * GOV i,t + α 45tVNON speci�ically,we estimate the following equations: ormer politician is at the top of the bank.
i,t−1 * MIN i,t−1 * GOV i,t + α 5TNN5tVNON speci�ically,we estimate the following equations: ormer politician is at the top of the bank.
i,t−1 + α 6 GOV i,t + i,t , with Y the reaction variables DEPG and IDEP. the politically connected CEO of chairman is currently in power. This reinforces the identification of our mechanism of political connections: it is the access to current political power that annihilates or even reverses depositor sensitivity to bank capital. This is in line with theories of political rent seeking by banks. On the other hand, this effect is again substantially smaller, though not absent, for former cabinet members. 17
The previous results raise the question of why banks even consider taking these former cabinet members on board in the first place. To understand the exact effect of the presence of a former cabinet member at the bank, we start by analyzing the evolution of the number of deposit accounts of politically connected banks. In Figure 1 Figure 1 . As long as the former politician is still at the helm of the bank, the number of government deposit accounts shows robust growth rates. Apparently former minister use their political clout to bring in deposits from a variety of government organizations. However, this positive effect is annihilated once the former minister leaves and the bank loses its political connection, as the number of government deposit accounts drops sharply in this event. Compared to the number of government deposit accounts, the number of non-government deposit accounts (solid line in Figure 1 ) exhibits lower growth rates before the departure of the former minister but not for the period after departure.
17 Non-significant regression parameters indicated again that the interaction variable × did not affect deposit growth or rates. Therefore, to prevent overspecification, the variables and × are not included in the following models.
Robustness
In Eq. 5 and Eq. 6 the political connection dummy variables are lagged by one period and hence are predetermined in explaining deposit growth and deposit rates, respectively. Furthermore, bank-specific effects control for unobserved bank heterogeneity. But there could still be unobserved time-varying bank-specific variables that affect both deposit growth and deposit rates and the bank's propensity to appoint former politicians. This is in line with the argument of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , who claim that corporate governance measures can influence performance and vice versa. If there is a selection problem, standard linear regression may produce biased estimates for the effects of political connections on deposit growth and deposit rates. Like Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) , we employ the Heckman (1979) two-stage treatment procedure to address this potential selection bias. Specifically, we employ a two-step random effects parametric approach as discussed by Vella and Verbeek (1999) , which is an extension of Heckman's two step procedure to a panel data context. In the first stage, we estimate a random effects probit model in which the dummy variable for political connections is regressed against the same controls as in the previous analyses as well as against three additional variables that distinguish between banks that hire former politicians and those that do not (i.e., conditioning variables). 18 We estimate two probit models for being politically connected (POL): one examines the determinants of appointing a former politician (PCON) and the other the determinants of appointing a politician who served as a cabinet member (MIN). The explanatory variables in both of these selection equations are all lagged by one year, and the identifying variables are ln(#govdep + θ), z-score, and a measure of liquidity. The ln(#govdep + θ) is the natural logarithm of the total number of government deposit accounts (#govdep). We add θ, which is equal to one, because the existence of banks without government deposit accounts would otherwise eliminate observations. The z-score is a measure of bank stability z = , i.e., the average capitalization �EQ TA ⁄ =
Equity
Total Assets � and return on assets (ROA) during the four preceding years over the 4-year standard deviation of the return on assets. 19 Banks with lower z-scores are considered to be more risky, i.e., have a shorter distance to default. The liquidity measure, Liquid TA ⁄ , is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets.
The z-score is a condense measure of bank stability. It is unobservable to depositors because they have neither access to the information needed for its calculation nor the sophistication to do so or to interpret the results. But banks are aware of their potential instability and may anticipate health problems by seeking protection and forbearance through political connections. We therefore expect this z-score to be unrelated to the bank's deposit growth and deposit rate, but related to political connections. The presence of government deposits by itself, is not related to deposit growth or deposit rates, since the size of government in the economy is relatively stable over long time periods (and hence banks with more government deposit accounts cannot expect their deposit level to grow faster) and the rates on government deposits and other deposits of the same size are comparable. Banks without access to government deposit accounts can however aim at improving their access to government deposit accounts and their market share of these accounts, by relying on new political connections. Therefore, banks with a low number of government deposit accounts may want to obtain political connections. Liquidity, finally, is clearly related to the desirability of political connections. Illiquid banks may rely on political connections to either improve their liquidity or to induce the regulator overlook their lack of liquidity.
Banks with higher liquidity also have higher deposit growth rates and higher deposit rates (see Table 2 ), which implies that liquidity is a demand and not a supply shifter. So, although liquidity is related to deposit rates and deposit growth separately, it is not related to the market discipline we are after in this paper. Therefore, the presence of these three variables in the selection equation is appropriate.
The results of the first stage are presented in Table 4 , Panel A. Employing the broader definition of political connections (PCON), we find that banks with unfavorable liquidity positions are more likely to appoint leaders with political connections. Applying the more narrow definition of political connections, we find that banks may appoint former cabinet members (MIN) in the hope that their increased political clout will remedy some of their profound structural problems. In particular, we find that banks with a low number of government deposit accounts (see previous section), a lower distance to default, and a less favorable liquidity position are more inclined to hire former ministers, possibly in an attempt to obtain relief from some of these problems. The fitted values from the first-stage probit are then employed to generate the correction parameter for self-selection (inverse of Mill's ratio). In the second stage analysis, we include the inverse of Mill's ratios. As depositors react differently to the appointment of cabinet members as compared to ordinary parliamentarians, we differentiate between these choices, and include the inverse of Mill's ratio for being politically connected (λ PCON ) and
the inverse of Mill's ratio for selecting only past cabinet members (λ MIN ). The results of the second stage regression are presented in Table 4 , Panel B. Our earlier findings are robust. We find again evidence that there is a reduction in depositor discipline for politically connected banks, and that this reduction is mitigated if former cabinet members are appointed. We notice that quantity disciplining and price disciplining are reduced with the appointment of former politicians, and that this reduction in market discipline is mitigated with the appointment of former cabinet member through the quantity equation (Column 1).
From the deposit rate equation, we observe that market discipline is reduced with the appointment of former politicians (Column 3 and 4), and that this reduction is annihilated with the appointment of a former minister but only if the affiliated party of the former minister is in power (Column 4). 20 , 21
The bank-specific effects in Eq.5 and Eq.6 control for time invariant differences between politically connected banks and unconnected banks. The main variable of interest in both of these equations is * , which allows the vector Risk to have a different slope for a period in which a former politician is at the helm of the bank. However, since bank-specific effects cannot capture differences in slope between politically connected and unconnected banks, the concern is that the coefficient estimate for the interaction term ( * ) actually captures the differences between banks that never have a political connection and banks that do. To overcome this concern, as an additional robustness check, the Risk vector included in the previous regressions is allowed to have a different slope for politically connected banks (POLBANK). 22 The variable is equal to one for all 21 banks that ever hired a former politician in the sample period, and zero otherwise. 23 To be more precise, we estimate the following reduced form models:
Regression estimations of equations (7) and (8), are reported in Table 5 . The coefficients α 2 and β 2 capture the possible difference in slope for banks that have at some time appointed a former politician (POLBANK). The coefficients of α 3 and β 3 measure the change in intensity of depositor discipline for the period in which the politically connected director is at the top of the bank (PCON). In particular, if there is a reduction in depositor sensitivity to bank capitalization after the appointment of a former politician, we would find that α 3 < 0 and β 3 > 0. Secondly, in columns 5 and 6, we again show whether the appointment of former prime ministers or cabinet members (MIN) is perceived differently.
We confirm our earlier finding that depositor discipline is reduced for politically connected banks, but that this reduction is less dramatic for the appointment of former cabinet members.
22 Dinç (2005) uses a similar approach as a robustness check in his empirical analysis of government bank lending in election years. 23 Compared to banks that never hired a former politician as a chief-executive in the sample period (POL-BANK = 0), we observe that banks that did hire a former politician (POLBANK = 1) are on average older (50.33 years) and greater in size (natural logarithm of total assets in 1987 prices = 13.27), but employ less personnel per branch (24.30). Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Depositor discipline and the number of deposit accounts While our preference for the quantity equation is the first difference of the log of real value of deposits, this was only possible for total deposit liabilities. However, since Turkish data distinguish between deposit categories only by the number of accounts, and not by volumes, we reproduce our results for the quantity equation with the growth of the number of diverse deposit accounts. For the entire sample period, we can distinguish between the following numbers of deposit accounts: firm deposits, savings deposits, and interbank deposits. These categories enable us to see whether there is a disparity in depositor discipline between different types of agents, and how each one reacts to the appointment of a former politician at the head of the bank. Therefore, we estimate the following reduced form equation:
where # is a vector capturing the growth in the number of deposit accounts of different agents. We consider the following four sets of variables: #SAVDEPG is the growth in the number of savings deposits; #FIRMDEPG is the growth in the number of firm deposits; #BANKDEPG is the growth in the number of bank deposits; and #PRIVDEPG is the number of private deposits (with private deposits equal to the sum of savings deposits, firm deposits and bank deposits). The results are reported in Table 6 . We find some interesting differences in the disciplining behavior between agents. The findings in column 1 indicate that private depositors discipline banks in terms of their capitalization, and that the disciplining sensitivity diminishes with the appointment of a former politician, unless he was a former cabinet member. These results are in accordance with the hypothesis that appointing a former cabinet member may signal a structural problem (smaller distance to default) that is otherwise unobservable to unsophisticated depositors (see findings in section 5). We see a similar reaction by the holders of savings deposit accounts and from firms. Interbank creditors do not attach additional value to the appointment of former politicians, possibly because they are better informed about the underlying bank fundamentals. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Conclusions
Rather than evaluating the impact of political connections through wealth effects, we attempt to extend our knowledge of the impact of political connections on depositor loyalty by employing a depositor discipline framework. This approach allows us to verify how the average depositor reacts once the bank appoints a former politician. A strong political relationship can be considered an important intangible asset for banks in several ways. We test whether politically connected banks are less subject to market discipline by depositors.
We find that appointments of former politicians markedly affect depositor disci-pline. Specifically, depositors discipline their banks less when banks' top executives were formerly elected to parliament. This is especially the case when the former politician's party is currently in power, providing further evidence that our results indeed identify a political channel. However, this reduction in depositor discipline is partially or fully nullified if the concerned politician also served as a cabinet minister. This could be due to the fact that many of these former ministers were part of controversial governments, which elicited negative reactions by depositors. But we also provide evidence that banks are more likely to appoint former ministers if they are less liquid and closer to default, suggesting that appointing a minister may also send a bad signal of otherwise unobserved bank health to depositors. In addition, the additional government deposits that former ministers attract during their term at the bank tend to leave the bank upon their departure. All of our results with respect to the effect of political connections on depositor discipline are robust to controlling for possible selection effects.
Appendix 1 Turkish banking system
Initiated in 1980, the financial liberalization reforms abandoned almost immediately interest rate ceilings, removed quantitative controls on lending, facilitated bank entry, and stimulated financial innovation. Since the banking reforms, Turkish banking system experienced a troublesome transformation from government domination to private competition and dealt with two minor (in 1982 and 1991) and two major banking crises (in 1994 and 2000) . Turkish commercial banks operate as universal banks (offering a broad range of products and services such as deposit-taking, commercial lending, trading financial instruments, insurance, leasing and investment banking) that are largely homogeneous. Before liberalization, the banking sector was largely under state control and virtually no start-ups were allowed in this period. There were interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans and maximum limits on loan sizes in line with the import substitution strategy. In an environment of non-price competition, bank competition was focused largely on customer convenience, leading to a race to establish larger bank networks in order to take in more deposits. Table A1 shows that the average number of branches increased by almost 390 % and the average number of employees rose by more than 400% between 1963 and 1980. These were 33 deposit-taking banks, 3 of which were state-owned banks, 17 private domestic banks and 13 foreign banks. Although the share of public banks in total assets continues to decline gradually, its impact is still large compared to EU averages. The presence of foreign banks used to be limited because of the unstable environment and entry barriers.
However, the sector has recently attracted the interest of foreign banks because of the strong growth potential and solid economic recovery. The Turkish banking system still of-fers strong growth potential compared with EU countries. In the future, the environment of sustainable growth potential, relatively high margins, low inflation and declining intermediation costs are expected to support further growth in total assets, commercial loans and deposit volumes of the banking system, leading to a long overdue process of financial deepening.
Table A1
Overview of the Turkish banking system ented toward preservation of the status-quo and sought to impose significant institutional constraints (e.g., establishment of a second parliamentary chamber and a constitutional court with powers to invalidate government policy) on the government's discretion (Tachau and Heper 1983) . These constraints produced huge rigidities for the system, and are believed to be partly responsible for the political instability, which governments seemed powerless to remedy (Esfahani 1996) . Table A2 presents an overview of the parties in power after the 1960 coup d'état.
Table A2
Post 1960 elections and governments in Turkey
